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Granatstein: DND in the 1970s

Making the Department of National
Defence Work in the 1970s
The Deputy Minister and the CDS Remember
J.L. Granatstein

I

n 1988, Robert Bothwell and I were
completing our research for the
final volume in the Canadian Institute
of International Affairs’ series Canada
in World Affairs. As the concluding
volume in the long-lived series, the
ordinary two-year time span was
abandoned; instead, the book was
to cover the 1968 to 1984 period,
or, in other words, all of Prime
Minister Pierre Trudeau’s foreign
and defence policy (as well as the Joe
Clark interregnum). Moreover, it had
been many years since the preceding
volumes had appeared. This delay
gave us the opportunity to make
use of a wider range of manuscript
sources than in most of the earlier
volumes, and we secured access to a
very broad spectrum of government
and private papers.
We also conducted almost two
hundred interviews, some together,
others alone. Two that I did myself
were with “Jadex”, General Jacques
Dextraze, the great fighting soldier
who became chief of the defence staff
in 1972, and with Sylvain Cloutier, the
deputy minister in the Department
of National Defence from 1971 to
1975. Dextraze had led units with
distinction during the Second World
War and in Korea, been chief of staff
to the UN operation in the Congo,

Abstract: In the aftermath of unification,
the Canadian Forces were struggling
to deal with the changes that
overtook them, not least the Trudeau
government’s relative indifference to
the military, the impact of bilingualism,
and massive reorganizations. General
Jacques Dextraze, who became chief
of the defence staff in 1972 and Sylvain
Cloutier, the deputy minister in the
Department of National Defence from
1971 to 1975, played key roles in
managing the changes. Interviews
conducted by J.L. Granatstein in 1988
indicate where they agreed – and
disagreed – and tell us much about the
characters of these two key figures.

served as chief of operations at
Mobile Command and then as chief
of personnel at National Defence
Headquarters before becoming CDS.
Cloutier, his civilian colleague in
arms, was commissioner of the public
service, deputy secretary of the
treasury board and deputy minister
of taxation in the Department of
National Revenue before going to
DND as deputy minister.
In the aftermath of
unification, the Canadian Forces
were struggling to deal with the
changes that overtook them, not
least the Trudeau government’s
relative indifference to the military,
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the impact of bilingualism, and
massive reorganizations. Dextraze
and Cloutier played key roles in
managing the changes, and these
interviews indicate where they
agreed – and disagreed – and tell us
much about the characters of these
two key figures.
As was my regular practice, I took
notes during these long conversations
rather than using a tape recorder.
Immediately after each interview,
I typed up a memorandum, not a
transcript, of the discussions. These
memoranda were used as sources
for Pirouette: Pierre Trudeau and
Canadian Foreign Policy, published
by the University of Toronto Press
in 1990, and are reproduced below
with a few excisions and with
minor stylistic and grammatical
corrections. The memoranda can
be found in Bothwell’s papers in
the University of Toronto archives
and in the Granatstein fonds at the
York University archives, along with
memoranda of all the interviews
conducted for the book. Copies of
the memoranda are also deposited at
the Canadian War Museum and the
Directorate of History and Heritage,
NDHQ.
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Interview with Sylvain
Cloutier, Ottawa,
20 January 1988

H

is interest in DND started
in 1968 when he was at the
Treasury Board [as deputy secretary].
He was trying to change the form of
the estimates to give them structure,
to present them in a manner that
combined legal and financial sides
and assisted management in setting
and reporting on objectives. DND
despite unification was still three
services with civilian and military
components. He grouped all votes
under a single programme (except
the Defence Research Board) and
started cutting fat off the estimates
of which there was a lot. The DND
structure wasn’t geared to its mission,
and this was a period of scandals
(e.g., the HMCS Bonaventure refit).
Then in 1971 he was told he was
going to DND as deputy minister
by Gordon Robertson [clerk of the
privy council]. The government
wanted a hard manager and Donald
Macdonald [the minister of national
defence] also wanted him. He didn’t
know Don well, but as deputy
secretary of the Treasury Board, he
and Macdonald attended some of
the same Cabinet committees. His
mandate was to make DND work.
Cloutier arrived in September
1971 and found the management
review group (MRG) in operation
under John Pennefather [and trying
to mesh the civil and military parts of
DND]. Macdonald told him to take
an interest in the MRG’s operations,
and as he thought DND had to be
re-directed he was glad to do so. The
MRG could be the way to change
direction. But by the time it reported
in early 1972 Macdonald was gone
and Edgar Benson was filling in.
By then Cloutier had his own ideas
on how to run DND, and the restructure he imposed was not that
recommended by the MRG, although
in line with its philosophy.
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Cloutier decided there had to be
a strong chief of the defence staff.
General F.R. Sharp was retiring in
1972 and he wasn’t a strong manager,
something Cloutier had decided by
Christmas 1971. Jacques Dextraze
was strong, and Cloutier got the
government to name him CDSdesignate early in 1972 so he and
Cloutier could get underway as soon
as possible. Sharp, he said, was a fine
man who went along with the new
direction but left the hard decisions
for Jadex to handle. In the end, Sharp
was sent on tour for the last months
of his term.
Within a month, Cloutier had
a key meeting with the minister,
CDS, etc., and started the restructure
rolling. It took 2-3 months to put flesh
on the bones – the submission to
Treasury Board was 2-3 inches thick.
The concepts put forward by Cloutier
were novel and predicated on the
basis of friendship and cooperation
between the CDS and the deputy.
He and Dextraze worked closely for
five years and never once disagreed
in public. When they fought it was
in private; at a meeting, if they
disagreed, they’d kick each other
under the table and change the
subject. Now there was resistance
to having the deputy with such
power – co-equal to the CDS, same
rank, same pay – but the deputy was
responsible for DND management
and the CDS for the operations of the
forces. Certainly Cloutier never gave
an order to the forces – if that was
necessary, he’d get the CDS to do it.
What he did do was to integrate
activities which had been parallel in
the three services or parallel in the
military and civilian components
of the deputy’s office. The deputy’s
office had about 200 personnel when
he took over; after the change, it had
three or four. He created structures
that let the CDS and the deputy both
use them – this eliminated hassles
and sped up the process.

The Defence Research Board
(DRB) was a crown corporation
with its own budget and it did what
it wanted. To Cloutier, DRB had
to be made to do what the military
wanted. In two stages, DRB was
absorbed, leaving only an advisory
board which was soon eliminated.
The chief scientist became a senior
officer under the ADM Materiel. This
gave better resource management
and made DRB serve military needs.
Cloutier also did a re-structure
of the Canadian Forces Commands.
He created Air Command which was
negotiated between he and Jadex,
then done. He brought in General
Chester Hull, a big, tough, first class
man and the best manager in the CF
to be vice chief of the defence staff
(VCDS) – talked him out of retiring
by saying this was the biggest job in
the country. He managed to shuffle
General Michael Dare, the previous
VCDS with whom he didn’t agree, off
to the Privy Council Office. For e.g.,
in 1972 the government wanted to cut
budgets and asked departments to
suggest cuts. Cloutier asked Dare for
suggestions, and his first offering was
to eliminate the reserves and save $30
million. Cloutier, horrified, could see
the political fallout and refused.
In the first year he restructured
DND and changed the management.
He brought in Lew Crutchlow from
Treasury Board to be ADM Materiel
and Tom Gregg from business to head
the finance side. He created military
associate DMs (three star officers)
in materiel and finance, but not in
personnel where the military was on
top and a civilian was associate DM.
To him, the military wasn’t
special. The management of
resources and people was the same
as elsewhere.
This reorganization created
resentment, largely at the novelty of
what he was doing, and at the fear
that civilians were taking charge. It
wasn’t true, however; the civilians
were just making an appropriate
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contribution. The proof of that was
when Cloutier left in 1975 the system
didn’t change. There was a different
style but his system survived. There
was a strong respect for authority in
DND, and that helped. There were
also problems with the civilians
outside DND. At Treasury Board, the
secretary, Al Johnson, didn’t believe
in the changes, but Cloutier dealt
with him by calling a meeting where
military and civilians talked for three
hours with Johnson and swung him
round. It wasn’t Cloutier—it was
“we” at DND.
But he wouldn’t have succeeded
without Dextraze. They worked the
system out together and started on
this the first night they met at a mess
dinner at Rockcliffe. They then went
to Cloutier’s house and drank crème
de menthe together until 3 am. That
persuaded them they could work
together.
At one meeting in the summer of
1972, he and Jadex and General Ross,
the senior personnel officer, plotted
postings for the next ten years. All
the CDSs for the next decade were
on that list, and they determined the
kind of experience generals needed to
prepare for the top. Ramsey Withers,
e.g., they decided needed policy
experience and command of a large
front-end command. They gave him
both.
The big flaw in DND was in
programme development which
was tough as there was no money.
In the pre-Cloutier period, a service
developed a programme, then put it
to the deputy minister who had to
re-do it all over again (for how could
the deputy OK something without
going through it?). In his early days
at DND, Cloutier said he got a huge
stack of paper to justify the purchase
of 48 Boeing 707 aircraft. This wasn’t
on the budget which was frozen. Why
48?, he asked Sharp. The Orions had
to be replaced and they needed twice
as many anti-submarine warfare
aircraft. Was this documented? No,
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Sylvain Cloutier

but we need twice as many. Cloutier
refused to sign.
He cited a 1973 example when the
Navy made a case to replace the old
destroyers [DDHs]. They started the
staff work and made a presentation
in two parts: on the ships they then
had and on their personnel. Dextraze
said what Cloutier wanted to hear.
The Navy should prepare a new
presentation relating their mission
to the ships they needed. The Navy
always thought in terms of where
they’d been – history, in other words
– not of their mission. That was why
the frigate programme took so long.
Dextraze’s view was that you might
have fewer toys for the boys to play
with, but at least you’d have more
efficient utilization of resources.
What Cloutier did was to create
a programmes chief, always 2-star
military, and integrated him under
the civilians who worked in the
Deputy Minister’s office. This way
the financial concerns of the civilians
could be brought to bear on the
process, and this worked well and
faster as capital programmes had to be
gone through once only. Eventually
the 707 became the Aurora and 48
became 18. He had forced the military

to measure the capacity of the aircraft
against the need. In his view, the
military could choose an aircraft. But
he had to insist on testing that choice
against the economic priorities of the
government and its international
commitments. If you bore those in
mind then you could get Supply
and Services, External Affairs, and
Trade and Commerce on side, and
the submission to Cabinet would be a
complete piece of work that answered
all the questions. That way you got
your proposals accepted.
His aim was to marry resources
to purposes; otherwise you misused
resources. When he took over, the
capital budget was 12 percent of the
DND budget; his goal was to get
it up to 22 percent. Indeed he got
the DND budget increased within
six months – with a $125 million
pay raise, the first since the freeze.
That was his first priority (“I’m not
dumb”). He was also able to get the
OK for things DND couldn’t have
got before. For example, though
Trudeau disliked tanks, he got a
decision for armoured cars reversed.
They were good for nothing, and
he got tanks back. Don Macdonald
[by then finance minister] told him
“that’s not why we put you there.”
Cloutier replied, “You should have
told me.” He had asked the military
what tank was best and they had said
Chieftains or Leopards. At the same
time, the Germans were negotiating
to train at Shilo, Manitoba. He found
out the Germans would rent tanks
and although the Canadians didn’t
like this, the choice was rent or none.
As it worked out, they rented tanks
initially then bought them, and they
could use the German tanks at Shilo
when the Jerries weren’t.
DND didn’t have the people it
needed to carry out its commitments.
As a result, all units were
undermanned. Each day they’d meet
for “morning prayers” and report on
readiness. But Cloutier asked “ready
for what?” They started examining
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the shadow establishments, then
deciding what they needed as war
establishments, then what they
could afford. This was a beginning
on a White Paper process, a way of
demonstrating with sound analysis
the gap between what they had and
what they needed. Cloutier claimed
there was no evidence of decline in
military capability.
He had created ADM Policy in
an attempt to get DND more clout
with External Affairs which hitherto
had made policy and told DND to
implement it. The implementer has
to have a large role in making policy,
and that was why the change. He also
started loaning bright young officers
to Treasury Board and bringing
Treasury Board people into DND.
Later programmes were easier to
push through as a result.
Ministers: He had 26 ministers
from 1965 in all his portfolios.
[Defence minister] James Richardson
[1972-76] was a “horse’s ass” and
Jadex and he spent a lot of time
trying to prevent him doing stupid
things. Cloutier was so despairing
at one point that when he ran into
Trudeau at a party, he asked to be
moved from DND and told him
why. Trudeau said he had the same
reaction to Richardson, but said
that Cloutier was in DND because
he trusted him. Richardson was a
small mind, impressed with his own
public relations. He would only make
speeches if Cloutier wrote them. Nor
was he sympathetic to bilingualism
which Cloutier spent much time
on. In November 1972, Richardson
asked him what he was doing.
“Bilingualism.” “It’s not a priority.”
“It’s mine,” Cloutier said. Richardson
tried to stall proposals like the Frenchlanguage training centre at St. Jean,
sitting on the memo for three weeks.
Cloutier again met Trudeau and told
him Richardson was holding this up
while other ministers were asking
for it. Trudeau replied he should
make an effort in the next week
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to get Richardson to sign but if he
wouldn’t then he, Trudeau, would.
As it turned out Richardson did sign.
The Minister also wanted to close
CFB Suffield and move the scientists
to his own Winnipeg riding. Cloutier
got Cabinet to block this. He was the
worst minister he ever served.
He had known Trudeau a long
time and knew he wasn’t keen on
DND. It took two years to get the
principle established that the capital
share of the budget should be 25
percent, and by the time he left DND
in May 1975 he had the 3 percent
above inflation [annual budget
increase] through. The structure he
and Jadex developed was designed
to deal with Trudeau – time couldn’t
be wasted in having civilians and
military in DND fighting each other.

*****
General J.A. Dextraze
interview, Ottawa, 12 April
1988.

W

e began with unification.
He favoured integration but
disliked unification which he feared
would ruin the forces. His view
was that men fought because of
regimental loyalties, for their friends
and not for their country. Unification
could hurt this. [Paul] Hellyer was
advised by three air officers, [William]
Lee, [Edwin] Reyno, and [F.R.]
Sharp, and the air people simply
didn’t understand the navy-army
unit feeling. But he didn’t resign.
[Admiral William] Landymore was
stupid to do so. What you do is fight
against, lose, and try to make the new
system work. That was what he did
as a 24-year-old battalion commander
in Italy when his brigadier told him
to attack where he didn’t want to.
Still, he said, unification didn’t hurt
his Mobile Command units in 1967
[sic: 1968].

He was asked to be VCDS to
Sharp. He said no. Then he was
offered the CDS job (instead of
[General Michael] Dare) by [acting
minister Edgar] Benson...which
surprised him as he thought he
was going to Mobile Command. He
said yes, and it was announced the
next day (April 1972). Sharp was in
the Far East. Dextraze took over in
September.
When he became CDS he applied
himself to openly de-unifying where
he could – naval ranks, uniforms on
ships and abroad, individual ship
names on caps. He didn’t want newold uniforms – he could do better
things with $50 million.
Air Command was his idea. He
told [James] Richardson all air should
be under one command for training,
maintenance, and procurement,
but naval helicopters, e.g., would
be under command of Maritime
Command. It was logical but it did
cause fights. It would be easier if each
environment had its own air element
but that was costly.
As CDS, he said, he travelled to
the troops in the field. The VCDS ran
the HQ. He took a sergeant with him
to make notes on decisions so there
could be follow up.
He and Sylvain Cloutier had
met and talked over the necessity
of ending the civil-military clash in
DND. The forces had been unified,
and now the civil-military operations
at NDHQ had to be unified. It was
clear the minister had to be at the
top, the deputy minister and the
CDS together in the box immediately
below. The running of the forces was
the CDS’ job, and the deputy was to
support the CDS in getting what he
needed. Syl didn’t like this but was
persuaded.
He and Cloutier did the
integration of the civilian and
military streams at NDHQ. They
were both honest, cooperated, didn’t
fight in public but went at each other
in private. At meetings, Dextraze
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was in the chair with Syl on the left,
and the VCDS on the right. If they
disagreed in a meeting, the decision
was delayed until they could resolve
it in private. Once in one private
argument Cloutier broke down and
cried and Dextraze took him in his
arms and comforted him. He then
talked to Syl’s wife, found out he was
ill, and bugged him into seeing the
quacks. It was clear they really liked
each other. He remarked on how Syl
would agree to divide subjects at
Cabinet Committee presentations but
then leap into Dextraze’s areas. Once
Trudeau smiled and asked Dextraze
what he had to say. “After hearing
Admiral Cloutier..., “ he began. But
this was just Syl’s style. There was a
kind of shyness in Cloutier. Dextraze
thought he admired Dextraze’s power
and strength and his making him do
things. Cloutier was a schemer which
was good, someone who could make
things happen.
He had made an error in the way
they divvied up posts at NDHQ under
the integrated system. ADM jobs
were to be interchangeable except
for finance. Syl wanted policy too but
Dextraze refused. The problem was
the civilians were now taking over
at NDHQ because the spots weren’t
fixed in concrete. Certainly the old
system didn’t work. The civilians
fought the military and DND never
got anywhere at Treasury Board
where the deputy ministers always
preferred the word of [Cloutier’s
predecessor, Elgin] Armstrong –
really difficult to deal with – over that
of the military.
As for who ran things, he or Syl,
Dextraze was convinced he did. They
worked together but it was his show.
I asked how he reacted to comments
that Cloutier had conned him. He was
amused (sort of) and said that so long
as he got what he wanted, and he did,
people could think that.
He talked about tanks. Trudeau
didn’t want any, and Dextraze told
him if that was the case get the
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Jacques Dextraze.

troops off the NATO central front.
Don Macdonald also didn’t want
tanks or fighter aircraft. Eventually
Trudeau agreed to tanks in Europe,
but Dextraze persuaded him there
had to be some here for training.
Which tanks? He preferred US ones
if they could be secured (as the US
was the closest source of supply)
but the US Army was in the midst of
developing a new main battle tank.
He had to get rid of the Centurion and
the new UK tank was too heavy. The
Germans were re-equipping with the
Leopard I (the II was on the drawing
boards), so he saw the German CDS
with whom he was friendly and
persuaded him to arrange a meeting
with the German defence minister.
He told the minister he needed only
a hundred or so, that these could
be found by giving German units
a few less. He got him to agree by
stressing that Trudeau was usually
in disagreement with everything, but
that he had agreed to a new tank (he
was sure Trudeau thought Dextraze
couldn’t get new tanks). As a result,
Dextraze sent his ADM Materiel to
Germany and it was all worked out.
Trudeau, he said, was not really
anti-military. Honest, hard-working,
with his own ideas of what was
best. If you couldn’t persuade him

otherwise, he would do what he
wanted. People were afraid of him,
but not Dextraze. He usually saw him
once or twice a year – in a crunch.
Dextraze was funny on
Richardson as minister. He had
admiration for him, a good fellow,
well-meaning. But he was a dummy,
a racist, and was absent when brains
were handed out. Dextraze said they
fought on French-English questions,
and he said, “Do you think you
can just bury six million French
Canadians? They won’t lie down.”
Jim would reply by talking about the
costs of having two languages. “So
just speak French,” Dextraze replied.
He was weak in the House, so weak
that he couldn’t defend himself and
the Opposition laid off out of pity.
When they disagreed, Dextraze
would say he wanted to see the
prime minister. Richardson said no,
but the CDS, Dextraze insisted, had
the right to do so. One day Dextraze
wrote Richardson a letter to tell him
that he knew he wanted to be a good
minister and could be one by doing
the following x points. He made only
one copy and sent the letter by hand.
The minister then called him and
Dextraze went over with his copy
which Richardson tore out of his
hand and ripped up. “The letter has
never been received.” But the next
day, being a good fellow, Richardson
called up to say he couldn’t sleep and
to apologize. He and Cloutier had
to plot together on how to deal with
Richardson. When Jim resigned he
called Dextraze in Brussels to tell him
he was going. Dextraze urged him to
wait until he got home, but the next
day he read that he’d quit.
[Barney] Danson [minister 197679] was much better. He had been a
fighting soldier, understood troops
and vice versa.
Don Macdonald he liked for
his hard work. As Finance minister,
however, he had bitterly opposed the
new tanks and was really annoyed
when Dextraze kept plugging for
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them and finally succeeded. But as
defence minister, Macdonald didn’t
push for cuts in NATO.
The armoured cars in Canada
he knew weren’t great things. Lousy
75 mm gun, etc. But they were all he
could get, could be used to train tank
crews, and they had utility in civil
disorders.

I

*****

n the four decades since Sylvain
Cloutier and Jacques Dextraze
worked together at national
defence, the verdict on the Trudeau
government’s handling of the
Canadian Forces has been harshly
rendered. The shock of unification
was profound, and it was followed
by the only slightly lesser impact
of bilingualism on a hitherto
mostly-unilingual military. Add to
that budget freezes, increasingly
obsolescent equipment, and the
general impact of the unpopular
Vietnam War on the way the military,
even the Canadian military, was
perceived by the public, and it was
a dark time indeed. But even rapid
change must be managed, and the
deputy minister and the chief of the
defence staff did their jobs well.
The relationship between
Cloutier and Dextraze was a close
one, as these interviews show, even
though each man was convinced
that he was the directing force,
the dominant player. Scholars can
form their own opinions over, for
example, who created the idea of
Air Command or who persuaded the
government to secure new tanks, and
they will likely be as divided in their
views as were senior officers who
worked in NDHQ during the 1970s.
What is clear is that the two men
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Chief of the Defence Staff General Jacques Dextraze (right)
during a visit to Baffin Island in the Canadian north, circa 1972.

integrated the civilian and military
sides of the department, changed the
way the headquarters functioned,
and secured rather more funding
and equipment for the Canadian
Forces than seemed possible from
a prime minister who was cool to
the military and a finance minister
who tried very hard to keep defence
spending down This was a major
achievement, one that could not have
been accomplished if the CDS and the
deputy minister had not cooperated
closely. No one could have made the

1970s a time of glowing achievement
for the Canadian Forces, but matters
could have been much worse. That
might be a tepid comment, but it is
intended as a compliment to Dextraze
and Cloutier who served Canada and
the Canadian Forces well.

J.L. Granatstein is the author of the second
edition of Canada’s Army: Waging War and
Keeping the Peace (University of Toronto
Press, 2011).
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